


61-7120

MS
WZ

September 26, 1961

STAT



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Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

AWD:at

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When Mr. Dulles signed this, he said he was holding the incoming letter as he wished to read it again. mfb 9/28

September 18 1961

Mr. Allen Dulles
Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency
24th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am enclosing copy of a memorandum which I have prepared since I last saw you. I have sent one personally to Bob Kennedy and one to my very secure Senator friend, Scoop Jackson, who is not only most interested in the cause of secret intelligence but also, may I add, is a sincerely devoted friend of yours. He personally asked me for any ideas that I had.

I have made only four copies of this memorandum and have made no other distribution.

I do hope it will be of some help. I feel so strongly about the matter, as I indicated to you, that I want to do whatever I can as a private citizen to prevent the boat from being rocked.

I want to tell you again how pleased I was to have the pleasure and honor of talking with you at length at your home that sultry evening in Washington.

I do hope that you had some rest on your "vacation" trip to Europe.

Please let me know at any time if I can be of any help in any way.

Devotedly yours.

Enc.

MEMORANDUM RELATING
TO THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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PREFACE: This memorandum has been prepared in the earnest hope that no precipitate decisions will be made which would or might impair seriously the effectiveness of our intelligence system.

SUMMARY OF MEMORANDUM

1. The highest degree of professional competence must be maintained. If this is not done, we may lose ten or more years in valuable time, trying to recreate a professionally competent system.

See Annex A.

2. There is a real danger in interposing a super intelligence analyst as the President's immediate adviser in lieu of the Director of the C.I.A. On paper, to a layman, it might appear logical. In fact, it would be highly impractical.

See Annex B.

3. Despite problems in covert intelligence and covert operations ** revealed publicly in the U-2 and Cuban

* See brief biographical statement attached hereto.

** The latter is not discussed in this memorandum because of the priority which, at this moment, should be given to the preservation and continuing improvement of our covert intelligence system.

incidents, we should not undermine the basic structure of the C.I.A. or downgrade it. It is believed that adequate means of more effective coordination with State and Defense Departments and other agencies can be otherwise achieved.

See Annex C.

4. The criteria for the selection of the director of any intelligence system such as C.I.A. are so difficult to combine in any one person that there are few, if any, men in the United States today who are sufficiently qualified to assume the responsibilities of Mr. Allen Dulles, the present Director.

See Annex D.

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ANNEX A

The highest degree of professional competence must be maintained. If this is not done, we may lose ten or more years in valuable time, trying to recreate a professionally competent system.

Secret intelligence involving foreign relations prior to World War II was conducted on an unorganized and primarily individual basis.

Unlike certain European countries, we, as a nation, were not alerted to its real importance.

As early as 1798, when President Adams revealed the XYZ negotiations with France, American public opinion became aroused, but virtually nothing was done about setting up a real secret intelligence system for over a century and a half.

We have had many devoted intelligence and counter-intelligence officers in the Army and Navy before, during and after World War I and in the interregnum between the two World Wars.

It was not, however, until World War II that the first really covert integrated system of intelligence was developed under General William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.



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While the British and some of our European allies and enemies had developed the techniques involved, we were almost entirely lacking in training and experience.

We learned the hard way and made many mistakes, but it was an essential beginning.

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The foregoing conclusions are supported by the report of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate, entitled "Intelligence and National Security", Report No. 1750 of the Second Session of the 86th Congress, which sets forth, among others, the following "tested principles":

1. The collection and evaluation of intelligence is a job for professionals. Intelligence organization should be tight, centralized, responsive, and to the greatest possible extent anonymous.

Annex A - 2

2. Officials who **depend** upon intelligence must be professional in handling the problems which it raises.

3. The conduct of diplomacy must be insulated from sensitive intelligence operations. Intelligence is a source of information for diplomacy - not a part of it.

ANNEX B

There is a real danger in interposing a super intelligence analyst as the President's immediate adviser in lieu of the Director of the C.I.A. On paper, to a layman, it might appear logical. In fact, it would be highly impractical.

The theoretical reason is that a staff adviser to the President could present to the President a more objective summary and analysis of intelligence, since he would not be beholden to any one source, i.e., C.I.A., State, Defense, A 2, O.N.I., etc.

This is logical, but it is not practical, and might be dangerous. These are some of the reasons:

1. As pointed out later in this memorandum, there are very few men professionally adequate to assume such a responsibility. A semi-pro would be worse than an amateur, just as a little knowledge may be worse than none.

2. Even if such a qualified man were available, he would be living in an "ivory tower", unless he were to build up a new empire which would duplicate, in substantial part, the intelligence gathering and research and analysis functions and operations of C.I.A. A failure to fully comprehend and evaluate intelligence operations from all original sources to final estimates could be fatal in times of emergency.

3. Even though there may continue to be jealousies between various collecting sources of intelligence, which, after all, is human, it is believed that there has been achieved, in recent years, a greater coordination in effort even than that which existed during the critical years of World War II in one or more important theatres.

4. The C.I.A., one has ample reason to believe, has developed an important rapport with secret intelligence agencies of other friendly countries. This is of great value, and the avenues of communication are, naturally, secret. To downgrade C.I.A. in the eyes of its friendly equivalents might dry up, in whole or in part, useful areas of cooperation, as well as other very important sources of information.

ANNEX C

Despite problems in covert intelligence and covert operations revealed publicly in the U-2 and Cuban incidents, we should not undermine the basic structure of the C.I.A. or downgrade it. It is believed that adequate means of more effective coordination with State and Defense Departments and other agencies can be otherwise achieved.

Mistakes have been made by C.I.A., by State Department and by other departments and agencies of the government. Both inside self criticism and public criticism are constructive to the extent that they do not impair security.

Certainly every effort should be made to repair and prevent human and organizational mistakes.

"If, when we make our mistakes, we make them falling forward, we have little to fear. It is when we make our mistakes falling backwards that it hurts."

Let us not fall backwards.

The problem does arise, particularly in view of the Cuban affair (which, in historical perspective, may tend to disprove certain assumptions not germane to this memorandum), as to the methods to prevent the apparent lack of the fullest possible degree of coordination.

Coordination is necessary.

On the State Department, Army, Navy, C.S.S. and O.W.I. levels in the fields of political and psychological warfare, and on the Army, Navy and C.S.S. levels of secret, deceptive warfare, both psychological and otherwise, during the latter stages of World War II this was achieved to a somewhat remarkable degree in Washington, D. C., and also very effectively in certain theaters.

Toward the end of World War II, we had weekly meetings in Washington, D. C., on propaganda and secret, psychological warfare policies and practices. Sometimes, these meetings were held even more often. It may be that such regular coordination meetings are now being held, but, in any event, it would appear that there is room for improvement in the techniques of cooperation without indulging in any major structural reorganization, which not only takes time but undoubtedly would impair morale. This, no doubt, has already been adversely affected by newspaper releases relating to C.I.A.


ANNEX D

The criteria for the selection of the director of any intelligence system such as C.I.A. are so difficult to combine in any one person that there are few, if any, men in the United States today who are sufficiently qualified to assume the responsibilities of Mr. Allen Dulles, the present Director.

It would appear that the following are virtually indispensable criteria to be applied in the selection of any director of a secret intelligence system:

1. Superior intelligence.
2. Creative imagination.
3. Extensive and intensive knowledge of all techniques relating to covert intelligence activities. Included among these are such related and partially unrelated functions and activities as the following:


- a. Completely covert agents;



- e. Counterintelligence, in full cooperation with all U. S. counterintelligence units;

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k. An effective system, which normally takes years to develop, of assessing and estimating the value of original sources of information and intelligence. Unassessed information may be partly pure gossip or false information which has been planted and is therefore dangerous.

4. Outstanding devotion and inspired interest. This qualification must not be underestimated, for covert intelligence is dangerous business. The real pros, both here in America and overseas, realize it. Those who are carrying out dangerous intelligence operations overseas are entitled to have as the head of the agency for whom they work a man of devotion and inspired interest.

Even the best informed men in the intelligence field would have great difficulty in recommending to the President any man to succeed Mr. Dulles who would qualify under all of the above criteria. Mr. Dulles does. He has had over twenty years of continuous service in the field. It would probably take at least ten years for anyone who has not had adequate secret intelligence experience to become sufficiently trained to assume the responsibility.

For all of these reasons, it is earnestly recommended that Mr. Dulles be strongly encouraged to remain as Director of C.I.A. until he and those responsible for the selection of a successor are satisfied that whoever is eventually chosen is thoroughly qualified.

61-71281

September 26, 1961

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(EXECUTIVE SECRETARY)

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